Public guarantees in the event of joint bank failures can result in systemic risk-taking and distort financing decisions of banks. I argue that the pricing of syndicated loans provides an ideal laboratory to study such distortions. In the absence of systemic risktaking, non-diversifiability of aggregate risk implies that the compensation required for taking on aggregate risk is higher than for idiosyncratic risk. However, in the presence of public guarantees, banks have higher benefits from taking on aggregate risk as this leads to higher correlation across banks. Consistent with the latter, I find that banks charge lower lending interest rates for aggregate risk than for idiosyncratic risk, controlling for firm, loan and bank specific factors. Importantly, there is no evidence for systemic risktaking for the sample of non-bank lenders who do not benefit from public guarantees. I also find that effect is larger for smaller and less correlated banks, consistent with higher a priori benefits from systemic risk-taking for such banks. The evidence provided suggests that public bail-out policies have significant ex-ante costs by distorting financing decisions in the economy.
Introduction
Since the recent financial crisis is essentially a systemic crisis in which a large fraction of banking sectors failed simultaneously and incurred huge economic and social costs, systemic risk-taking at banks has become an important agenda for both policymakers and researchers. This paper aims to provide empirical evidence of banks' systemic risk-taking in the market of syndicated lending. Specifically, I document systemic risk-taking from the pricing of syndicated loan contracts. More importantly, I relate the banks' risk-taking incentive to the "too-many-to-fail" guarantees in the bailout policy.
Banks may take systemic risk due to the fact that bank failure resolutions of regulatory agencies depend on whether the problem arises due to idiosyncratic or aggregate reasons (Acharya and Torulmazer, 2007) . According to the review of the history of bank failures and resolution by Hoggarth, Reidhill and Sinclair (2004) , in case of individual bank failure, regulators usually stand alone and seek private sector resolutions, such as merger and acquisition or liquidation. On the contrary, regulators often intervene in systemic crises in the forms of liquidity support, blanket guarantees or capital injections, when the cost of discontinuation of investment, fire sales and contagion outweighs the cost of bailout. The bailout in joint bank failures, or "too-many-to-fail" summarized in Acharya and Torulmazer (2007) , may distort banks' incentives ex-ante when banks are aware of safety in similarity. Therefore, banks have strong incentives to make any problem a system-wide one and therefore maximize the likelihood of joint failure and hence collective bailout. A simple way for banks to take systemic risk is to expand aggregate exposure to the state of the economy. Essentially, banks can build up systemic risk at the balance sheet by investing in the aggregate risk in assets.
How can we learn about systemic risk-taking from the pricing of loans? In absence of systemic risk-taking, the compensation required for aggregate risk should be higher than (or at least as high as) the compensation for idiosyncratic risk 1 . This is because idiosyncratic risk is diversifiable (imperfectly though for banks, in contrast to stock investors). Hence lending rates for aggregate exposure should be higher than for idiosyncratic exposures. Suppose now that a "too-many-to-fail" bailout policy is in place, in which the regulator bails out banks if they fail jointly (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007) . This provides incentives for banks to take on risks that make them more correlated. Taking on aggregate risk is the easiest way to become correlated as most banks can easily increase exposure to aggregate risk (by contrast, herding on for example a specific exposure, like a certain region, will be more difficult for banks) 2 . Thus, the "too-many-to-fail" guarantee provides a rationale for banks to charge lower lending rates for taking on aggregate risk relative to idiosyncratic risk. Evidence of lower lending rates for aggregate risk, after properly accounting for other factors, is thus evidence for systemic risk-taking at banks.
I empirically examine this question using a sample of the U.S. syndicated loans from Dealscan over the period 1988 to 2011. Adopting equity volatility of the borrower to proxy for the aggregate and idiosyncratic risks of the loan contract, I find that loan spreads are positively associated with borrowers' idiosyncratic risk whereas negatively associated with aggregate risk, controlling for borrower, loan and lender specific factors as well as year dummies. A one standard deviation increase in idiosyncratic risk raises the loan spread by 35 basis points, whereas a one standard deviation rise in aggregate risk lowers the lending rate by 5 basis points. Although the spread undercut on aggregate risk is not economically significant, the results imply that bank do not charge risk premium but rather offer lending rate discount to aggregate risk, which to some extent reveals the expected magnitude of the bailout subsidy a bank can obtain. Overall, the underpricing of aggregate risk relative to idiosyncratic risk can be taken as evidence of systemic risk-taking at banks. This pricing pattern is robust to risk measures of equity volatility from CAPM regression and Fama-French three factor regression. In addition, I show that such pricing patterns are not driven by borrowers' or lenders' unobserved heterogeneity as the results continue to hold when firm fixed effects or bank fixed effects are included.
Public guarantees in systemic crises apply largely to banks 3 . Nonbanks hence constitute an important control group. Consistent with systemic risk-taking driving the results for the 2 I am fully aware of the distinction between the two terms, systematic risk and systemic risk, as classified in Hansen (2012) . Systematic risk is the aggregate risk which cannot be diversified away. Systemic risk refers to the risk imposed by interbank correlation that may bring down the entire banking industry. Still, the two concepts are intrinsically linked in my framework.
3 Although large non-bank firms such as AIG, General Motors and Chrysler were also bailed out in the recent financial crisis, they accounted for a very small fraction of bailout recipients of the failed financial institutions.
Therefore, the likelihood of being rescued by the public guarantee remains low for non-bank lenders.
For the list of bailout recipients, please visit ProPublica http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list. To track the list of bailout bank in the Capital Purchase Program, please visit http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout/ bank sample, I find that for the sample of non-bank lenders, lending rates are higher for aggregate risk consistent with the traditional portfolio theory. This provides strong evidence that results in the bank sample are driven by systemic risk-taking incentives.
An important motive for systemic risk-taking is the "too-many-to-fail" policy, which provides lowly correlated banks a rationale to become correlated in order to benefit from the bailout subsidy (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007) . Consistent with this, interacting borrowers' aggregate and idiosyncratic risks with a market-based interbank correlation dummy, I find that less correlated banks charge lower spreads on aggregate risk relative to more correlated banks. When splitting the sample into two subsamples of highly and lowly correlated bank, I find only lowly correlated banks offer interest rate discounts on aggregate risk. The test of the impact of interbank correlations on loan pricing restricts the sample to publicly traded banks. To test the "too-many-to-fail" effect in a more general sample, I rely on bank accounting variables and test whether small banks are more aggressive in systemic risktaking, a proposition in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) . Interacting a bank size dummy with borrowers' aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, I find that smaller banks charge lower spreads on aggregate risk relative to larger banks, in line with the prediction of "too-many-to-fail" story. It is notably that the large banks require more compensation for both aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, different from the standard "too-big-to-fail" story.
On top of the evidence from loan pricing, I provide supplementary evidence from lending quantity to support the argument that the "too-many-to-fail" guarantee has been driving systemic risk-taking. I show that less correlated banks tend to lend more to borrowers of higher aggregate risk in both relative facility shares and absolute loan amounts. This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, in spite of fruitful studies on bank risk-taking in general (see Laeven and Levine, 2009; Keeley, 1990; Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler, 2013; Gropp, Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010; DeYoung, Peng and Yan, 2013; Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués-Ibáñez, 2010) , the specific research on bank systemic risk-taking has been concentrated on theoretical models as it is challenging to empirically identify systemic risk-taking behaviors in the real world. This paper adds new empirical evidence of bank systemic risk-taking from the syndicated loan market. In contrast to Cai, Saunders and Steffen (2011) who document bank systemic risk-taking based interconnectedness of banks which is directly constructed from syndicated loan portfolios, I illustrate systemic risk-taking from the underpricing of aggregate risk of loans.
More broadly, this paper is related to the discussion of the impact of government guarantees on bank risk-taking. Banking theory suggests two opposite effects coexist. On the one hand, government support augments a bank's charter value and therefore discourages risk-taking (Keeley, 1990) . On the other hand, public support mitigates market discipline as the incentive for investors to monitor the risk-shifting at the bank is reduced (Merton, 1977; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Gropp, Gruendl and Guettler, 2013; Brandao-Marques, Correa and Sapriza, 2012) . Empirical studies present, however, mixed results, indicating that the net effect of government guarantees on risk-taking is ambiguous and depends on which effect dominates (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003) . This paper adds new empirical evidence that the moral hazard effect of the government support dominates as banks protected by the "toomany-to-fail" guarantee tend to take systemic risk aggressively. This is related to the finding that suppoted banks charge lower loan spreads relative to a market benchmark by Gadanecz, Tsatsaronis, and Altunbas (2012) .
Last, though the "too-many-to-fail" problem has drawn extensive attention in banking regulation especially since the recent financial crisis (Vives, 2011) , empirical work testing this theory remains scarce. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first which unveils evidence of the ex-ante effect of "too-many-to-fail" that banks may intentionally extract bailout subsidies by taking systemic risk in expectation of the "too-many-to-fail" guarantee.
Brown and Dinc (2009) is related to my paper, documenting evidence of the ex-post effect of "too-many-to-fail" that regulators are reluctant to close failed banks when other banks in the country are also weak.
My empirical findings suggest large systemic risk-taking effect of public guarantees. Importantly, the findings unveil distortions as banks inefficiently underprice aggregate risk.
Therefore, this paper has messages for public policy debate over banking regulation. First, banking regulation should focus on macroprudential regulation and operate at the collective level. Second, small and lowly correlated banks have been taking systemic risk aggressively and therefore need more regulator's attention.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out testable hypotheses.
Section 3 presents the data, methodology and summary statistics. Section 4 examines evidence of bank systemic risk-taking from loan pricing. Section 5 analyzes the incentive for systemic risk-taking and highlights the importance of public guarantees. Section 6 tests the impacts of the "too-many-to-fail" guarantee on systemic risk-taking by examining the pricing patterns of banks of different interbank correlations and sizes. Section 7 shows banks not only underprice aggregate risk but also lend more to borrowers of higher aggregate risk. Section 8 concludes.
Hypotheses development
According to the portfolio theory, under the assumption of perfect diversification and no distortions, aggregate risk of the asset should be priced whereas diversifiable idiosyncratic risk should not. However, in the context of bank loans, idiosyncratic risk of the loans is likely to be priced but never more than aggregate risk for two reasons. First, most loan portfolios are imperfectly diversified or even limitedly diversified. Second, banks usually bear the losses from firm-specific defaults. However, if a bank expects to obtain bailout subsidies in a systemic crisis, then it may require lower compensation for aggregate risk relative to idiosyncratic risk as banks are less worried about losses in aggregate shocks in expectation of joint failure and collective bailout. Overall, distortions from the bailout policy lead banks to take systemic risk and underprice aggregate risk. This leads to the first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Banks require lower loan spreads for aggregate risk relative to idiosyncratic risk, indicating systemic risk-taking.
Public guarantees can be a candidate for driving systemic risk-taking at banks. Since bailout guarantees are challenging to measure or proxy in a direct way, I use the presence (or absence) of public guarantees over banks (non-bank lenders) to test the impact of guarantees on risk-taking. In particular, banks are protected by explicit or implicit public guarantees that regulators and government will support them in a systemic crisis in the forms of capital injection or liquidity support. Hence banks could have incentives to take systemic risk. On the contrary, non-bank lenders which are not protected by any public guarantee should have no incentive to take systemic risk and therefore charge higher spreads for aggregate risk.
Taken together, I propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Non-bank lenders which are not protected by public guarantees do not take systemic risk and require higher loan spreads for aggregate risk relative to idiosyncratic risk. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) model the "too-many-to-fail" problem that a bank reg-ulator finds it ex post optimal to bail out failed banks when the number of failures is large, whereas the probability of the collective bailout is low when the number of bank failures is small, as failed banks can be acquired by surviving banks. The ex post optimal bailout exists in the circumstance that the misallocation cost of liquidating bank assets to outside investors in case of systemic banking crisis exceeds the cost of injecting funds. Therefore, the bailout expectation creates incentives for banks to herd ex-ante in order to maximize the likelihood of failing together and therefore collective bailout. To test that systemic risk-taking is driven by the "too-many-to-fail" guarantee, I predict less correlated banks may be more aggressive in taking systemic risk as the marginal benefit of increased systemic risk could substantially raise the likelihood of joint failure and hence the collective bailout subsidy.
Hypothesis 3: Less correlated banks are more aggressive in systemic risk-taking relative to more correlated banks.
To corroborate the argument of "too-many-to-fail" effect, I predict smaller banks charge lower lending rates to aggregate risk, based on the prediction that smaller banks have stronger incentives to take systemic risk in Acharya and Yozulmazer (2007) , different from the "too-bigto-fail" effect. This is because that the bailout subsidy increases in the systemic risk-taking for small banks when big banks also fail but it does not increase for big banks when small banks fail as big banks can acquire failed small banks (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007) Hypothesis 4: Smaller banks are more aggressive in systemic risk-taking relative to larger banks.
3 Data, Methodology and Summary Statistics
Data
Syndicated loans provide an ideal laboratory to test systemic risk-taking at banks. First, syndicated loans are a vital source of corporate finance in the U.S. (Sufi, 2007) and represent a substantial fraction of bank loan portfolios (Ivashina, 2009) . Second, for each loan contract Dealscan provides rich information about the identities of borrowers and lenders which allow me to control for a variety of borrowers' and lenders' characteristics. Specifically, I can study how the characteristics of the banks (investors) of loans (assets) may affect the pricing. This is less of a problem given my focus on the characteristics of lead arrangers. According to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) , Sufi (2007) and Santos and Winton (2008) , leader arrangers are delegated to collect information and monitor the borrower on behalf of the syndicate 9 .
4 Before 1987, the coverage of Deanscan is uneven. For an overview of the Dealscan database, see Strahan (1999) .
5 This is a common practice in the loan pricing literature. See similar analyses in Nini (2007), Focarelli, Pozzolo and Casolaro (2008) , Santos (2011), Gaul and Uysal (2014) .
6 I am indebted to Sudheer Chava and Michael Roberts for providing the link between Dealscan with Compustat, see Chava and Roberts (2008) .
7 I link LPC Deanscan with Compustat via GVKEY. Next, I use PERMNO to link Compustat with CRSP. 8 Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue that a fairly long event window is required to measure the volatility that is publicly observed by corporate bond investors.
9 Dealscan indicates the role of each lender. I follow the classification rule in Cai, Saunders and Steffen (2011) . If the variable LeadArrangerCredit indicates "Yes", a lender is classified as a lead arranger. I correct for the role of lenders of loans that LeadArrangerCredit indicates "Yes" but "LenderRole" falls into participants as non-lead arrangers. In addition, if no lead arranger is identified, I treat a lender as a lead arranger if
In addition, leader arrangers set lending rates and non-pricing loan terms. By contrast, participants play a rather passive role in the syndicate. Therefore, it is a reasonable assumption that the lead arranger plays the role of the single bank lender in bilateral corporate lending of assessing the credit worthiness of the borrower and making decisions on risk-taking.
Moreover, I restrict my sample to loans originated by a single lead arranger and exclude loans originated by multiple lead arrangers in order to clearly capture the effect of the lender's characteristics on loan pricing 10 . I manually match lead banks in Dealscan with commercial banks in Call reports, depending on bank names, geographical locations and operating dates. 
Loan pricing model
In the empirical analysis, I estimate the following loan pricing model:
where f , i, b and t denote facility, firm, bank and year, respectively. The dependent variable, LoanSpread , is the all-in-drawn spread in Dealscan which denotes an interest rate spread over LIBOR measured in basis points. It is summarized by Dealscan as a measure of its "LenderRole" is classified as following items: Admin agent, Agent, Arranger, Bookrunner, Coordinating arranger, Lead arranger, Lead bank, Lead manager, Mandated arranger, Mandated Lead arranger.
10 It makes little sense to aggregate lenders' characteristics (both leader arranger and participants) for loans with multiple lead arrangers. Nevertheless, my results hold for loans granted by multiple lead arrangers.
overall costs of the loan, accounting for both one time and recurring fees. IdioVol and AggVol represent idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, respectively. Moreover, I include firm specific variables (Firm i ), loan specific variables (Loan f ) and bank specific variables (Bank b ). I also include year dummies T throughout all specifications. is the error term. I estimate the baseline loan pricing model by cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid observations. Robust standard errors are clustered at the lender level to correct for correlation across observations of a given bank, though the results hold when clustering at levels of borrowers or borrower-lender pairs.
To compute the key independent variables, idiosyncratic and aggregate risks of the borrower, I rely on the borrower's equity volatilities which are forward-looking and are driven by market information. The idea is that I can think of the holder of risky debt as the owner of riskless bonds who have issued put options to the holder of firm equity (Merton, 1974) . The strike price equals the face value of the debt and reflects limited liability of equity holders in the event of default. Increased equity volatility raises the value of put option, benefiting the equity holder at the expense of the debt holder. Hence a firm with more volatile equity is more likely to reach the bound condition for default. In addition, there is a burgeoning literature that applies equity volatility to explain credit spreads. In a seminal paper Campbell and Taksler (2003) find evidence that equity volatility, especially idiosyncratic equity volatility, has substantial explanatory power for corporate bond yields. Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) and Ericsson, Jacob and Oviedo (2009) apply the same logic to credit default swap (CDS) pricing and find equity volatility is an important determinant of CDS spreads. Equity volatility has also been applied in empirical banking literature. Gaul and Yusal (2013) relate total equity volatility with loan spreads to explain the "global loan pricing puzzle" in Carey and Nini (2007) . Santos and Winton (2013) use stock volatility as a proxy of the borrower's default risk. Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2013) also use equity beta to explain the cost of credit lines.
To decompose borrowers' equity volatility into idiosyncratic and aggregate components to proxy idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, respectively, I run a standard CAPM regression as follows:
where r i , r m t and r f ree t represent individual stock daily return, market return calculated as the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks in CRSP and risk free return proxied by the one-month Treasury bill rate, respectively. I define the idiosyncratic volatility as standard deviation of the residual, IdioV ol CAP M =SD( ). In addition, I define the aggregate risk as the product of beta and market volatility, AggV ol
where M arketV ol is the standard deviation of market excess return (SD(r m − r f ree )).
Alternatively, I adopt Fama French (1993) three-factor model using the following regression:
Where the market factor M KT t is the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NAS-DAQ stocks from CRSP minus the one-month Treasury bill rate, the size factor SM B t is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, the value factor HM L t is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios, respectively. I stick to the standard deviation of the residual IdioV ol F F = SD(ε) as the idiosyncratic volatility. On the other hand, following
Balin, Brown and Caglayan (2012) I define the aggregate risk in the multifactor model as the total volatility that is attributable to Fama French factors and the factors' cross-covariances,
In the end, I annualize all equity volatilities by a multiplier of √ 252 as daily stock returns are used.
I include a number of firm level controls that may affect the lending interest rates. LSALES is the log of the firm's sales at close in millions of dollars. Larger firms are more informationally transparent, therefore I expect larger borrowers have lower spreads. Next, LEVERAGE is a ratio of total debts to total assets. Highly leveraged firms are more likely to default and hence are expected to be charged a higher lending rate. Besides, I control for PROFMARGIN, which measure the performance and profitability of the borrower. As a highly profitable firm is safer and less likely to fall into financial distress, it should be charged a lower spread. As for the firm specific controls that affect loss given default (LGD), I include new working capital and tangibles assets. NWC measures a ratio of net working capital to total assets. Firms with more net working capital are expected to lose less value in the event of default. In addition, TANGIBLES measures a fraction of tangible assets to total assets. Borrowers with a higher fraction of tangible assets are more informationally transparent (Morgan, 2001 ) and have higher values in the event of default as the value of intangible assets are much volatile.
Therefore I expect a lower spread on the loans taken out by borrowers with a higher fraction of tangible assets. I control for Market-to-Book ratio, MKTBOOK, an imperfect proxy of Tobin's q, which is a ratio of the market value of a firm to its accounting value. I expect a firm with a higher Market-to-Book ratio to have lower spreads 11 .
Even though nonpricing loan specific variables are jointly determined with loan spreads and therefore are endogenous, I include these contractual terms. I include LFacilitySize, measured by the log of the facility amount in millions of dollars. Large loans are likely to be associated with greater credit risk in the underlying project and lower liquidity, but could also be borrowed by larger firms which have more cushions against adverse shocks. Therefore, the impact of LFacilitySize on loan pricing is not unambiguous. Additionally, I include Maturity which is the maturity of the facility in years. The effect of maturity on loan spreads is also ambiguous. Next, I use the number of lenders in a facility, NoLenders and the number of facilities within a deal, NoFacilities to proxy the syndicated structure. To measure the liquidity exposure of each facility, I classify a loan as a line of credit (REVOLVER) or a term loan (TERMLOAN ) 12 . Moreover, I include dummy variables that indicate whether a loan is senior (SENIOR) in the borrowers' liability structure and whether the loan is secured by collateral (SECURED). Seniority and collateral may reduce the lenders' loss in the event of borrower default and therefore reduce lending rates, however, the contractual arrangement may be required ex-ante to protect lenders towards specifically risky borrowers. Therefore, the relation between seniority, collateral and loan pricing is an empirical question. Last, I
control for loan purpose dummies into five categories: Corporate Purpose, Debt Repayment, Takeover, Working Capital and Other.
As the loan contract is negotiated between the borrowers and lenders, lenders' characteristics may also affect contract terms and have been incorporated into the analysis of loan pricing recently. Analyzing the effect of banks' financial health on loan spreads, Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) find less capitalized bank charge higher spreads than well capitalized 11 The results are robust to including industry dummies that classify borrowers into ten sectors based on 2-digit SIC codes.
12 In particular, a loan is classified as a revolver is the loan type is expressed in Dealscan as "364-Day Facility", "Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.", "Revolver/Line >= 1 Yr.", "Revolver/Term Loan", "Demand Loan", "Limited Line". Alternatively, a loan is defined as a term loan if the loan type is recorded as "Term Loan", "Term Loan A", "Term Loan B", "Term Loan C", "Term Loan F", "Delay Draw Term Loan".
banks. Examining how bank capital, borrower cash flow and their interaction affect loan pricing, Santos and Winton (2013) show that less capitalized banks charge relatively more for borrowers with low cash flow but offer discounts for borrowers with high cash flow. Santos (2010) emphasizes the impacts of bank losses on loan contracts. He shows evidence of credit crunch in the subprime crisis that even though firms paid higher loan spreads and took out smaller loans during the subprime crisis, the increase in loan spreads was higher for firms that borrowed from banks that incurred large losses. In this study I consider following bank specific variables of lead arrangers. First, I include LSIZEBK as the log of bank total assets in millions of dollars. Large banks usually have diversified portfolios and good risk management, therefore I expect large banks charge low lending rates. Next, I control for CAPITALBK, denoted as a ratio of bank capital to total assets. Well capitalized banks have more capital buffer and therefore are expected to charge a lower spread. In addition, I use NPLBK, a ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets, as a measure of bank credit risk. Risky banks may charge additional compensation for undertaking extra risk. Hence, I expect banks with a higher proportion of nonperforming loans to charge a higher spread. I also use ZSCOREBK as a direct measure of bank risk. I calculate Z score following Laeven and Levine (2009) but use an eight-quarter rolling window. Moreover, I include a bank profitability measure ROABK. More profitable banks are expected to charge a lower rate. To control for the impact of bank liquidity on loan rates, I include LIQUIDITYK to measure the liquidity of bank assets, which is a ratio of sum of liquid securities and cash to total assets. Besides, I
include COSTOFFUNDSBK which is total interest expenses over total liabilities to measure funding costs. In the end I use the growth rate of loans (LOANGROWTHBK ) to measure investment opportunities of the lender.
In particular, I use the accounting information of the borrower and lenders from the fiscal year ending in the calendar year t − 1 for loans made in calendar year t. To eliminate the bias from outliers, I winsorize loan spreads, firm and bank specific variables and borrowers' equity volatilities at 1 and 99 percentile levels 13 . I include year dummies to capture time trends throughout the analysis as Santos (2011) has shown the business cycle effect on loan contracts.
13 See Table A1 for detailed information of variables.
Summary Statistics
The final sample consists of 11 278 facilities taken out of 4 183 publicly listed U.S. nonfinancial firms from 469 U.S. banks over the period 1988 to 2011. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the sample before winsorizing. The average loan spread is 208 basis points over Libor. The average CAPM Idiosyncratic Volatility is 0.56, very close to the mean of total volatility. Since market is usually relatively stable, the average Aggregate Volatility which is the product of Beta and Market Volatility is rather small (0.12), much smaller than the average beta (0.76).
It is worth noting that aggregate volatility could be negative as the beta of some borrowers is negative. Overall, the idiosyncratic and aggregate volatilities estimated from CAPM and Fama French three factor models are quite similar.
Looking at firm level controls, I find the average log of firm total assets is 5.6. It is worth noting that the log of facility size can be negative when the loan is pretty small. The mean of borrowers' leverage is 0.28. The profit margin is highly skewed, with a mean of -0.21 and a median of 0.03. The mean of net working capital to total assets and tangible assets to total assets are 0.21 and 0.69, respectively. The average Market-to-Book ratio is 1.82.
I turn to the loan controls in the sample. The average log of facility amount is 3.79.
The information of the retained share of lead arrangers is available for a small proportion of around 5700 facilities only. On average, a lead arranger retains a share of 56 percent of the facility. On the other hand, the absolute amount of the lead arranger's stake is 2.64 when I look at the log of facility amount. Syndicated loans in the sample have an average maturity of 3.59 years. In addition, on average each syndicate has 6 lenders and is structured into 1.77 facilities. Looking at the loan types, 73 percent of loans are lines of credit while 24 percent are term loans. Almost all loans are senior in the borrower's liability structure. In the end, 75 percent of loans are secured by collateral.
I check the sample characteristics of banks. Except bank size and z score which are log adjusted, the rest bank specific variables are expressed in ratios. Banks are much larger as the average log of bank total assets is 11.24. The average equity to asset ratio is 0.08. Both In this section, I apply the baseline loan pricing model to examine bank systemic risk-taking. Table 2 reports the results using idiosyncratic and aggregate risks estimated from the CAPM regression. In all specifications, I run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid observations. The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. In column 1, I regress loan spreads on equity volatilities and year dummies only. The coefficient of the idiosyncratic volatility is positive and significant, indicating banks charge risk premium for bearing idiosyncratic default risk of the borrower. On the contrary, the coefficient of aggregate risk is negative and significant, suggesting that banks do not charge risk premium but rather offer lending rate discounts to aggregate exposure, consistent with hypothesis 1 that banks take systemic risk. In column 2, the main results are insensitive to the inclusion of firm level balance sheet variables. In addition, the firm characteristics have expected signs and are mostly significant. In particular, I find that larger firms, firms with higher profit margins, and less leveraged firms pay lower loan spreads. Proxies for net working capital and tangible assets have expected signs and are statistically significant. The market to book ratio is marginally significant and negatively associated with loan spreads. In column 3, I further control for loan specific variables, despite that loan spreads and other contract terms are simultaneously determined. The hypothesis 1 continues to be supported. Moreover, I
find that larger loans and loans with longer maturity are charged at a higher rate. The two proxies of syndicate structure have opposite effects. In particular, loans of more lenders in the syndicate are associated with lower spreads, whereas loans with more facilities are more expensive. Moreover, lines of credit are generally cheaper. A loan is much cheaper if it is senior when it ensures the priority of the lender to claim to residual value in the event of borrower bankruptcy. Furthermore, a secured loan is charged a higher spread than a similar one without collateral probably because only risky borrowers are required for collateral and are ex-ante charged a risk premium. In column 4, I add bank level controls, provided that the lender' characteristics may have impacts on loan pricing. As a result, my main results of systemic risk-taking continue to hold. Specifically, banks do charge a sizable spread on idiosyncratic risk. A firm of which idiosyncratic risk is one standard deviation (0.35) greater than the sample mean pays 35 (99.29 × 0.35) basis points extra. By contrast, a one standard deviation (0.11) increase in the aggregate risk lowers the loan interest rate by 5 (−41.56×0.11) basis points. Though the spread undercut on aggregate risk is not economically significant, it indicates that banks do not charge risk premium to cover the potential losses to aggregate shocks. Furthermore, I find that larger banks, well-capitalized banks, banks with high costs of funding and banks with high loan growth rates charge lower spreads while risky banks charge relatively higher spreads.
I do the same exercise using equity volatilities estimated from the Fama French three factor model in Table 3 . Overall, all estimates preserve the sign, significance and magnitude with the baseline results using CAPM equity volatility 14 . Again, the results hold when standard errors are clustered at the firm level (or firm-bank pair level) to correct for correlation across a given firm (bank-firm pair). For brevity, in the following output tables I do not report the estimated coefficients of firm, loan and bank specific control variables.
The use of equity volatility in our analysis relies on a crucial assumption that equity volatility captures the credit risk associated with the unobserved firm asset volatility. However, contingent claims model suggests equity volatility is a complex function of both asset volatility and leverage. A caveat may arise if, although leverage is a source of firm-specific credit risk, it can amplify or weaken the asset volatility effect and therefore contaminate the estimated effect of equity volatility (Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Gaul and Uysal, 2013) . For instance, Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue that debt holders of a company with a very small amount of debt are not worried about insolvency even if the equity is volatile. To better capture the credit risk, we can either deleverage equity volatility as in James and Kizilaslan (2012) by a multiplier or include an interaction term between leverage and equity volatilities.
We report the results in Table 4 . In the first two columns, we unlever the equity volatilities by multiplying a ratio of equity/(debt+equity), in which equity is the borrower's market 14 In unreported results, even though equity beta is not comparable to volatility, I use CAPM beta and market beta in the Fama French three-factor model as measures of aggregate exposure as robustness. I find similar evidence that banks charge lower spreads to aggregate risk. Similarly to the exercise in Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2013), when including both total volatility and aggregate volatility as key explanatory variables, I find coefficient of total volatility is positively and significantly and coefficient of aggregate volatility is negatively and significantly associated with lending rates. capitalization and debt is the sum of short term debt and half of long term debt. Consequently, the unlevered equity volatilities yield similar results to our baseline regressions. In particular, the coefficient of unlevered aggregate volatility remains significant and negative. In the last two columns, we include equity volatilities, firm leverage and two interaction terms. We find that banks still charge higher loan spreads to idiosyncratic risk, although the interaction term between idiosyncratic risk and leverage is insignificant, indicating banks do not discriminate firms of different leverages in the pricing of idiosyncratic risk. By contrast, although banks offer lending rate discount to aggregate risk, highly leveraged firms cannot benefit from the discount on aggregate risk. This pricing pattern indicates that banks charge risk premium for aggregate risk at highly leveraged firm, though systemic risk-taking is prevailing among low leverage firms.
The baseline specification may be prone to omitted variable bias if unobserved firm characteristics drive both firm's equity volatility and loan spreads. I restructure the data set into panel data in which I have i=firm as the cross section unit and f=facility as the time series unit. I estimate a firm fixed effects model, allowing for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved borrower effect and the observed explanatory variables. The identification comes from variations in equity volatility and loan spreads within the same firm. In particular, I compare loan spreads of the same firm across different loans when equity volatilities differ before the loan origination. The results in the first two columns of Table 5 further confirm the findings that idiosyncratic volatility is positively priced and aggregate volatility is negatively priced. The weak significance of aggregate volatility is the result of a short dimension along facilities within the borrower as each firm borrows on average 2.7 facilities in the sample 15 .
Likewise, to rule out the effect of unobserved bank characteristics on lending rates, I reorganize the sample into panel data in which b=bank is the cross-section unit and f=facility is the time series unit. I estimate a bank fixed effects model that eliminates the unobserved bank specific effects which are heterogenous across lenders but are constant over facilities of the same lender. Columns 3 and 4 present basically the same results. The highly statistical significance comes from the fact that each bank lends on average 30 facilities in the sample.
Taken together, I find that loan spreads are positively associated with idiosyncratic risk but negatively associated with aggregate risk of the borrower. The lending rate discount to aggregate risk can be interpreted as evidence of systemic risk-taking in syndicated loans. In the next section, I investigate the incentives for banks taking systemic risk.
5 Systemic risk-taking and public guarantees: Do non-bank lenders take systemic risk as well?
Although non-bank institutional investors have been actively participating in the syndicated loan market especially in the leveraged loan segment since 2000, loans originated by non-bank lenders to publicly traded U.S. nonfinancial companies remained substantially fewer than similar bank loans 16 . I collect 1788 loans originated by non-bank institutional investors, for instance, finance companies, corporations, mutual funds, trust companies, insurance companies and so forth, which are not protected by public bailout guarantees. For comparison, I collect bank loans originated by commercial banks, bank holding companies, thrifts, savings and loan associations (S&Ls). Because the status of investment banks and mortgage banks are ambiguous in bailouts in a sense that they are not strictly protected by public guarantee ex-ante but often obtain government support ex post in a systemic crisis, I exclude the two types of lenders from the sample. Table A2 displays the composition of my sample. One can see the majority of the non-bank loans come from finance companies.
I report the regression output for the loan pricing patterns by non-bank lenders and bank lenders in Table 6 . As the accounting information for non-bank lenders is not as readily accessible as banks, I only control for borrower and loan specific variables as well as year dummies. I find that both aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risks are priced similarly by nonbank lenders in columns 1 and 3. In particular, the estimated coefficient for aggregate risk is positive, significant, and slightly greater that the coefficient of idiosyncratic risk, in line with the prediction of the portfolio theory. In other words, the aggregate risk has been correctly priced by the non-bank lenders in the absence of public guarantees. In columns 2 and 4 the main results that banks charge lower lending rates to aggregate risk still hold. Overall, given that banks provide lending interest rate discounts to aggregate risk whereas non-bank lenders charge a significantly positive risk premium for aggregate risk, I conclude that the key distinction between the two cohorts of lenders, namely, the coverage of public guarantees, determines pricing patterns and systemic risk-taking at banks. 16 For descriptions of the role of non-bank lenders in the syndicated loan market, see Ivashina and Sun (2011) .
One concern may arise that my finding of the different pricing patterns of bank and nonbank loans could be the result of spurious correlation. For instance, banks serve observably less risky borrowers whereas non-bank lenders especially finance companies cater to observably more risky firms (Carey, Post and Sharpe, 1998) . This lending specialization which is omitted in my regressions may be argued as one driver of pricing discrepancy. However, this caveat is unlikely to bias my findings for two reasons. First, estimating the loan pricing models for the subsamples of bank loans and non-bank loans separately could control for this possibility.
Second, even if lending specialization affects the selection of the riskiness of borrower and therefore loan rates, it can only explain why non-bank lenders charge positive loan spreads on both idiosyncratic and aggregate risks to risky borrowers. Albeit it cannot explain the lending rate discount by banks without the introduction of banking regulation, particularly bailout subsidies.
6 Too-many-to-fail I directly test the "too-many-to-fail" argument by assessing the impact of interbank correlations on loan pricing. The idea is that less correlated banks have stronger incentives to increase interbank correlation and therefore take systemic risk in order to maximize the likelihood of failing together with systemically important banks. Therefore "too-many-to-fail" argument predicts that less correlated banks charge lower spreads to aggregate risk compared to more correlated banks 17 . To measure interbank correlations, I first calculate the correlation of the bank's daily excess return with the S&P 500 banking sector index using the data one year prior to the quarter of loan origination. Since the data of S&P 500 banking sector index start from the Q4 1989, the sample consisting of 9 251 loans taken out by 3562 firms from 259 publicly listed banks, is slightly shorter and smaller than the one used in the baseline analysis.
I construct a dummy variable LowCorrBK that equals one if a bank's interbank correlation is smaller than the median value and zero otherwise. Interacting the bank correlation with borrowers' equity volatilities, I estimate the following model:
The results based on CAPM equity volatilities are presented in column 1 in Table 7 . I find the idiosyncratic volatility is positively associated with loan spreads, suggesting that banks charge a risk premium for bearing the firm-specific default risk. On the contrary, the coefficient of aggregate risk is negative but insignificant. The interaction term between idiosyncratic volatility and low correlation dummy is positive and significant. The interaction between aggregate volatility and low correlation dummy is negative and significant, suggesting that less correlated banks charge lower lending rates on aggregate risk relative to more correlated banks. Taken together, I find less correlated banks underprice aggregate risk more relative to more correlated banks.
To relax the restrictions of identical coefficients of the firm, loan and bank specific covariates for the two subgroups of lowly and highly correlated banks in the baseline regression, I divide the sample into two corresponding subsamples. The results of sample split are given in the columns 3 and 5. I find that aggregate risk is negatively and significantly priced by less correlated banks whereas insignificantly priced by more correlated banks. This indicates less correlated banks have stronger incentives to take aggregate risk of borrowers and therefore increase systemic risk. Doing the same exercise using Fama French equity volatilities, I have similar results in columns 2, 4 and 6. Overall, I find evidence that less correlated banks have stronger incentives to underprice aggregate risk and therefore take systemic risk, consistent with the "too-many-to-fail" story.
Since the test of "too-many-to-fail" based on banks' stock information may be biased by sample selection as the sample is restricted to publicly listed banks and excludes numerous small banks. To correct for the sample bias, I also test the hypothesis that smaller banks are more aggressive in systemic risk-taking driven by "too-many-to-fail", as suggested by Acharya and Yozulmazer (2007) . To test the impact of bank size on risk pricing, I construct a dummy variable SmallBK that equals one if the bank size is smaller than the median value and zero otherwise. I then interact the small bank dummy with borrowers' equity volatilities. Overall, I run the following regression 18 :
I present the results in Table 8 . In column 1, I find banks generally charge a higher spread for idiosyncratic risk. The coefficient for aggregate risk and the interaction between idiosyncratic risk and Small BK are negative and insignificant. However, the interaction term between aggregate risk and Small BK is negative and significant, suggesting that small banks underprice aggregate risk relative to big banks. In the end, the coefficient of Small BK is positive but insignificant. Overall I find small banks underprice aggregate risk to idiosyncratic risk more relative to big banks do, indicating that small banks are more aggressive in taking systemic risk. For sensitivity analysis, I split the full sample into loans originated by small and big banks and report the results in columns 3 and 5. My results continue to hold. The exercises based on Fama French equity volatilities in columns 1, 4 and 6 yield similar results.
Taken together, I find small banks tend to underprice aggregate risk, which is different from the prediction of "too-big-to-fail" theory which asserts that large banks are likely to take risk to exploit the safety net.
7 Do less correlated banks lend more to aggregately risky borrowers?
Having shown that lowly correlated banks underprice aggregate risk, I examine whether they lend more to aggregately risky borrowers. A large stake in the syndicated loans granted to aggregately risky borrowers is another indicator of systemic risk-taking. I adopt two measures of lenders' stake in syndicated lending: Share Exposure, which is the share of the facility held by the bank, and Dollar Exposure, which is the log of facility amount retained by the bank.
I estimate the following model:
I report the regression results that less correlated banks take a larger share of the loan and a larger loan size when lending to a aggregately risky borrower in Table 9 . I use the relative stake measure, Share Exposure, as the dependent variable in the first two columns. I find banks generally hold a large share of the facility if the idiosyncratic risk of the borrower is high and aggregate risk is low. However, lowly correlated banks take a large share when the borrower is aggregately risky, in line with the prediction that less correlated banks have stronger incentives to invest in aggregate risk and to increase asset correlation. In the last two columns I use the absolute stake measure, Dollar Exposure, as the dependent variable. I have similar results that lowly correlated banks take a large size of loans when the borrower is aggregately risky. It is worth noting that the number of observations in the regression drops drastically since the information of loan share retained by the lead arranger is available for 47 % of the loan facilities. Overall, I conclude that less correlated banks not only charge a lower lending rate to the aggregately risky borrowers, but also take larger stake in aggregately risky loans.
Conclusion
This paper documents evidence of bank systemic risk-taking from loan pricing. I find loan spreads are positively associated with borrowers' idiosyncratic risk but negatively associated with aggregate risk. The lending rate discount for aggregate exposures reveals banks' preference for increased correlation and systemic risk. Relating this collective moral hazard to the "too-many-to-fail" guarantee in banking regulation, I show that no evidence of such systemic risk-taking could be found in the loans originated by non-bank lenders in absence of bailout expectation. In line with the "too-many-to-fail" theory in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) , I find less correlated banks and smaller banks are more aggressive in systemic risk-taking as they underprice aggregate risk of the borrower more relative to more correlated banks and larger banks, respectively. The findings also suggest that the results are not driven by the "too-big-to-fail" guarantee.
My findings have direct policy implications for macroprudential regulations. First, the fact that banks take advantage of the financial safety net and pass through regulatory subsidies to borrowers in the form of inappropriate pricing of risk may threat the stability of the entire banking sector. The prudential regulation should be designed to force banks to internalize the social costs incurred in systemic crises so that the incentive for systemic risk-taking is ameliorated. In particular, banking regulation should operate at the collective level to pay more attention to systemic risk on top of individual risk to cope with the collective moral hazard of systemic risk-taking (Acharya, 2009; Farhi and Tirole, 2009 ). For instance, systemic risk capital buffer requirement could be introduced as a policy instrument for macroprudential regulation. One recent example is that the Dutch central bank, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), intends to impose an additional capital buffer requirement on the four systemic banks in the Netherlands. In particular, this systemic buffer will be 3% of risk-weighted assets for ING Bank, Rabobank and ABN AMRO Bank, and 1% for SNS Bank. Second, much attention has been paid to systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) which contribute substantially to systemic risk. However, in this paper I show that small and lowly correlated banks have been aggressive in taking systemic risk and need attention for regulation as well. Therefore, extra capital buffer requirement based on asset correlation, which is applied to every bank as capital requirement based on individual credit risk, could be a desirable policy instrument for macroprudential regulation. In all specifications, I run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid observations. The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread. In column 1, I include equity volatilities only as explanatory variables. In column 2, I add firm specific variables as controls. In column 3, I further add loan specific variables as controls. In column 4, I include bank specific variables as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Borrower Equity Volatilities In all specifications, I run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid observations. The dependent variable is the all-in-drawn spread. In column 1, I include equity volatilities only as explanatory variables. In column 2, I add firm specific variables as controls. In column 3, I further add loan specific variables as controls. In column 4, I include bank specific variables as well. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Borrower Equity Volatilities Table 4 : Equity volatility and leverage In columns 1 and 2 we use unlevered equity volatilities. In columns 3 and 4 we interact equity volatilities with leverage. The dependent variable in all specifications is all-in-drawn spread. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the borrower level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
(1) In all specifications, I run cross-sectional OLS regressions that pool together all valid observations. The dependent variables are the share of facility held by the bank (Share Exposure) in the first two columns and the log of facility amount held by the bank (Dollar Exposure) in the last two columns, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the lender level and reported in parentheses below coefficients. ***, **, * denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Share Exposure
The share of loans retained by the lead arranger in the facility.
Dealscan

COSTOFFUNDSBK
Cost of funds, defined as total interest expenses over total liabilities.
Call reports and FR-Y9C
LOANGROWTHBK Growth rates of gross loans.
InterbankCorr Interbank correlation, defined as the correlation between bank stock return and S&P 500 bank sector index.
CRSP and Datastream
LowCorrBK Dummy for less correlated banks of which interbank correlation is below median value. 
